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The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Search Was Not A Valid 
Probation Search 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that the probation search was not valid under the 
Fourth Amendment because probation officers did not provide adequate notice 
of the search as required by the probationer's Fourth Amendment waiver. (R., 
pp. 123-25.) The district court erred for two reasons. First, because the 
probation search was justified by suspicion that the probationer, who lived in the 
house with Robinson, was in violation of his probation, the search was proper 
regardless of the terms of the probationer's waiver. Second, the evidence clearly 
established that the officers did in fact provide notice at the earliest opportunity, 
and therefore complied fully with the probationary Fourth Amendment waiver 
provision.· 
B. The Search Waiver Relied On By The District Court To Find The Search 
Unreasonable Was Irrelevant Because The Officers Had Reasonable 
Suspicion That The Probationer Was In Violation Of His Probation 
It is well established that a probation search based on reasonable 
suspicion that the probationer is in violation of his probation is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001 ); State v. 
Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 (2004); State v. Adams, 
146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008). Thus, a probation 
search based on reasonable suspicion of a probation violation is valid regardless 
of the scope of the waiver contained in the conditions of probation. State v. 
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Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242-44 (2006) (probation 
search based on reasonable suspicion of probation violation proper even though 
no Fourth Amendment waiver in place as condition of probation); State v. 
Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1983) (same). Because the 
probation officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the probationer, 
Diagneau, was in violation of his probation by drug use and harboring a felon, 
the probation search was valid regardless of the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
waiver in Diagneau's probation conditions. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 1-2.) 
Robinson makes no discernable response to the state's argument that the 
probation search was justified by reasonable suspicion of a probation violation 
regardless of the scope of the waiver. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8 
(making argument) with Respondent's brief, pp. 3-5 (never discussing whether 
the search was justified by reasonable suspicion).) Because the district court 
erred as a matter of law by 'finding the probation search unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, the suppression order must be reversed. 
C. The Evidence Established That The Officers Did Comply With The Fourth 
Amendment Waiver 
Even if the state had to rely upon the probation waiver as consent to 
search, the district court erred. The evidence clearly established that officers 
notified Diagneau of the search shortly after entry and as soon as practicable. 
(Prelim. Tr., p. 30, Ls. 5-12; p. 39, Ls. 12-15; R., p. 107.) That the officers 
secured the residence by doing a protective sweep before and during the 
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notification was constitutionally reasonable, especially given their suspicion that 
there was an at-large felon in the house. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) 
Robinson first contends that the state "argues that the search should be 
upheld because it was a protective sweep" and that this was an issue not raised 
below. (Respondent's brief, p. 4.) The only issue below and on appeal, 
however, was whether the officers properly conducted a reasonable and 
constitutional search. Because the evidence establishes that it was reasonable 
to secure the home before conducting the probation search, this issue was 
before the district court and is properly raised on appeal. State v. Bower, 135 
Idaho 554, 557-58, 21 P.3d 491, 494-95 (Ct. App. 2001) (state need not 
articulate every legal theory justifying search where constitutionality of search is 
bro1.1ght into issue by a defense motion to suppress and countered by 
presentation of evidence). 
Robinson next argues the protective sweep was unnecessary because 
Diagneau was no threat to officers. (Respondent's brief, p. 4.) Robinson rather 
conveniently forgets that officers had reason to believe that a felony fugitive was 
also in the home. 
The evidence establishes that the officers notified Diagneau of the 
probation search as soon as practicable. That they moved to secure the 
residence prior to providing the notification did not render the search pursuant to 
the probation waiver of rights constitutionally unreasonable. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Consider All The Relevant 
Evidence Of Actual Authority 
A trial court determining the existence of actual authority may rely on 
evidence unknown to officers at the time of the search or discovered in the 
course of the search itself. State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 689-90, 52 P.3d 329, 
333-34 (Ct. App. 2002). Therefore the district court erred in concluding that it 
could not consider evidence unknown to police prior to the search or found in the 
search. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) In response Robinson cites no authority 
for the proposition that actual authority must be proved with information known to 
officers before the search-he merely asserts this is so. (Respondent's brief, pp. 
4-5.) Because the law provides that the state may prove actual authority to 
consent with evidence obtained as a result of the search, reversal and remand 
for further proceedings is required. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order of suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2011. 
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